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Abstract 
The potential direct liability of hosting platforms such as YouTube and Dailymotion which 
provide the technical conditions for their users to upload and share copyright-protected content 
for the infringement of the right of communication to the public (CTTP) in Article 3(1) 
Directive 2001/29/EC (and pre-Directive 790/2019) represents one of the most complex and 
controversial aspects of current European Union (EU) copyright law. The test in Article 3(1) 
is opaque and may even support opposing conclusions on the matter. Doctrinally, the 
appropriateness of Article 3(1) to regulate hosting platforms is shaky as it is unclear how the 
regulation of platforms via Article 3(1) may reflect the balance of interests of rightsholders, of 
platforms, and internet users. Hosting platforms facilitate both the legal and illegal sharing of 
copyright content indiscriminately and in an automated fashion. When legal content is shared 
through their service, hosting platforms play an important role in facilitating the exercise of 
user’s freedom to send and receive information safeguarded by Article 11 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
The potential application of direct copyright liability to hosting platforms, including the spectre 
of damages, may chill technical innovation in the area. Some platforms may even close and the 
opportunities for internet users to share legal content reduce as a result. To address these issues, 
this article analyses the three alternatives for limiting the responsibility of hosting platforms 
under Article 3(1). The article first analyses the complex test for CTTP under Article 3(1). To 
balance the application of liability, Alternative 1 explores the option of integrating a ‘duty of 
care’ element conditioned by a standard of proportionality within the test for CTTP. Alternative 
2 challenges the notion that direct responsibility may be attributed to operators of hosting 
platforms. It analyses, but ultimately dismisses, the situation where host providers may be 
considered as mere providers of facilities for enabling communication. Alternative 3 advances 
a novel application of the test under Article 3(1) which shows that operators of certain hosting 
 




platforms do not engage in acts of “communication” of the illegal copyright material uploaded 
by their users. The purpose of the paper is to bring attention to particular possible constructions 
of hosting platform liability and their broader implications.  
A. Introduction 
The sharing of content on the internet is ubiquitous. Hosting platforms such as YouTube, 
Dailymotion and VMEO enable their users to store and share all kinds of videos, from a 
recording of a lecture to a video spoiler from a Hollywood film. The spectre of copyright 
infringement often appears. For example, a YouTube user’s uploads that consists of game-
plays of the video game Fortnite were removed from the platform because of copyright 
infringement and the user was subjected to an injunction.1 The rights of reproduction in Article 
2 and communication to the public (CTTP) in Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC2 (InfoSoc) 
are preventative so that any use of copyright works by third parties requires the rightsholder’s 
authorisation.3 A user’s act of uploading content that includes copyrighted works to a 
platforms’ server may breach the reproduction right in Article 2. In addition, the release – that 
is the sharing of that content to the online audience – may constitute the making available 
aspect of the CTTP right in Article 3(1). Infringement occurs if the rightsholder’s consent is 
not obtained in advance and none of the exceptions and limitations in the list in Article 5 apply. 
While the prima facie copyright liability of internet users is often easy to establish, enforcement 
is more problematic. On the internet, individuals’ identities can easily be cloaked in anonymity. 
It is difficult and economically unrewarding for rightsholders to identify and pursue copyright-
infringing internet users. It also makes for poor business practice to alienate infringing internet 
users as infringers are also consumers of copyright-protected content.4 
A more rewarding approach may be to address internet users’ infringement via the hosting 
platforms that store uploaded and facilitate the sharing of content, including that which may 
 
1 Ernesto Van Der Sar, “YouTuber ‘Golden Modz’ Settles Lawsuit Over Fortnite Cheats” (TorrentFreak, 19 
March 2019) <https://torrentfreak.com/youtuber-golden-modz-settles-lawsuit-over-fortnite-cheats-190319/> accessed 25 
April 2020. 
2 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (InfoSoc Directive) [2001] OJ L167/10. 
3 Soulier v Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication (C-301/15) EU:C:2016:536 [2016] 7 WLUK 126 at 
[33]. 
4 J.P. Quintais and J. Poort, “The Decline of Online Piracy: How Markets – Not Enforcement – Drive Down 




infringe copyright. There are several typologies of hosting platforms. One provides video 
sharing services, as for YouTube or Dailymotion. They store and index uploaded content, 
provide search facilities, categorise uploaded content and supply automatic preference-based 
recommendations to users. A related type includes social media sites such as Facebook and 
Instagram that enable the storage and sharing of pictures and short videos. Both types generate 
advertising revenue from the uploaded content. 
Another type of hosting platform is represented by cyberlockers, also known as file hosting 
services. Examples are RapidShare or FilesAnywhere which offer free storage and file-sharing 
services for all types of data. Unlike video sharing services, content uploaded on cyberlockers 
is not categorised and a search function is not provided. Instead, for each file uploaded a 
download link is made and sent to the uploading user. The link can be shared on other websites 
such as blogs, forums or “link collector” websites. Download speeds are limited for those with 
free accounts and unlimited for paid subscriptions. Some cyberlockers offer an incentive for 
users to upload desirable content.5 
The operators of these hosting platforms do not check the content that is uploaded by users and 
lack any specific knowledge of copyright-infringing content and specify in their terms and 
conditions that no infringing content should be uploaded. Video sharing and social media 
platforms also filter their networks and remove copyright-infringing content. 
Article 3(1) InfoSoc sets out a general exclusive right of CTTP for authors to “authorise or 
prohibit any CTTP of their works”. The travaux préparatoires of the InfoSoc Directive 
identifies two objectives of the right: to permit new exploitations of works and to ensure that 
rightsholders are satisfactorily protected.6 Using this right, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union has regulated situations where developments in technologies or new uses of existing 
technologies have led to the exploitation of works in a manner unforeseen by the rightsholders. 
 
5 Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in Frank Peterson v Google LLC, YouTube LLC, YouTube 
Inc., Google Germany GmbH and C-683/18 Elsevier Inc. v Cyando Ag (YouTube/Cyando) (YouTube/Cyando) 
(Joined C-682/18 and C-683/18) EU:C:2020:586 at [31]. 





Whether hosting platforms perform copyright exploitation under Article 3(1) is a matter 
currently pending in front of the CJEU in the joined YouTube/Cyando referrals.7  
Hosting platforms may foster the exercise of freedom of expression and information. Both the 
CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have recognised the importance of 
the internet for freedom of expression and information, safeguarded by Article 10 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).8 The ECtHR found that YouTube is a platform that enables information of specific 
interest to be broadcast, particularly on political and social matters, and citizen journalism to 
emerge.9 The ECtHR, in a case involving the temporary shutdown of a website following 
accusations of criminal copyright breach, observed that Article 10 ECHR guarantees freedom 
of expression to “everyone” and applies “not only to the content of information but also to the 
means of dissemination since any restriction imposed on the latter necessarily interferes with 
the right to receive and impart information”.10  
The application of a strict liability standard for hosting platforms under Article 3(1) would 
increase copyright protection and could generate massive financial liability. This may have a 
chilling effect on technological innovation in the area and foster monopolies.11 The problem is 
that the rules triggered in response to hosting platforms such as YouTube would apply to all 
types of hosting platforms irrespective of size or financial position or the level of innovation 
involved in the provision of their service. When only the big players are in the position to pay 
damages or to enter into licenses for the uploaded illegal content, smaller platform providers 
in weaker positions may close down. The problem is further compounded by the potential 
unavailability of a licence that platforms can pay for and that covers all the infringing content 
uploaded by users.12 A reduction in the number of such platforms may in turn reduce the 
 
7 YouTube/Cyando EU:C:2020:586. 
8 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV (GS Media) (C-160/15) EU:C:2016:644 [2017] C.E.C. 442 at 
[45]; Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), nos. 3002/03; and 23676/03 (ECHR 2009) at 
[27] and Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, no. 3111/10 (ECHR 2012) at [48]. 
9 Cengiz v Turkey App. No 48226/10; 14027/11 (ECHR 2015). 
10 Case of Pendov v. Bulgaria App. No. 44229/11(ECHR 2020) at [53]. 
11 For the US perspective on peer-2-peer technology see MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005) at [960]. 
12 M. Leistner, “Copyright law on the internet in need of reform: hyperlinks, online platforms and aggregators” 




avenues of internet users to engage in legal exchanges of information and engage in public 
debate on matters of general interest.  
This article shows that potential direct liability of those hosting platforms that provide the 
automatic technical setup for their users to upload and share content, including copyright-
infringing content, while having only general knowledge that infringing content may be 
uploaded may be curbed under Article 3(1) InfoSoc. This article first untangles the complex 
web of elements that form the test for CTTP under Article 3(1). Against this background, 
Sections C to E discuss the various interpretations of the CTTP right to curb the potential 
liability of certain host providers.  
Section C offers a new perspective on the proposal that the regulation of hosting providers may 
be achieved via the application of a duty under Article 3(1) for platforms to remove copyright-
infringing content on their network. This is set out as Alternative 1.  Although various options 
exist to impose such a duty, such an imposition may create incentives for the overenthusiastic 
removal of content, hence safeguards to this are paramount. 
Section D analyses the proposition of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in the YouTube/Cyando referral 
which sees hosting platforms such as YouTube and Cyando excluded from the scope of the 
CTTP right as they may engage in an activity covered by Recital 27 InfoSoc which states that 
“the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in 
itself amount to communication”.13 The section, set out as Alternative 2 in this article, 
concludes that the scope of Recital 27 may not be wide enough to accommodate the activities 
of hosting intermediaries. Instead, Section E advances Alternative 3 which is a novel 
application of the CTTP test which shows that certain hosting platforms may not be seen to 
perform an act of “communication” as certain hosts do not perform “an intervention in full 
knowledge of the consequences”. 
This article only analyses the situation of potential copyright infringement by hosting platforms 
under Article 3(1) and pre-Directive 790/2019 (DSMD).14 Certain host providers such as 
YouTube and Dailymotion may be covered by the concept of online content-sharing service 
 
13 Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in YouTube/Cyando EU:C:2020:586 at [86]-[89]. 
14 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and 




providers (OCSSP) in Article 17 DSMD which states that OCSSPs are liable for CTTP unless 
they conclude licences or comply with prescribed measures.15 This article is limited to the 
CTTP right in Article 3(1) InfoSoc, as the legality of the regime under Article 17 DSMD is 
pending before the CJEU.16 Should Article 17 be struck out, the CTTP right in Article 3(1) 
alone would remain relevant to host providers. The relationship between the CTTP right in 
Article 17 DSMS and the CTTP right in Article 3(1) InfoSoc is also not yet fully clarified and 
is an entirely different topic already covered by other authors.17 
B. The controversial contours of the legal test under Article 3(1) InfoSoc 
Article 3(1) implements Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.18 It introduces a general 
exclusive right which enables authors to authorise or prohibit: 
…any CTTP of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making 
available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public 
may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
Although the wording “any” indicates the broad scope of the right, the text of the Article does 
not specify what activities fall within the remit of the right. Only limited clarification is 
available in Recitals 23 and 27. Recital 23 excludes communications to those present at the 
place where the communication originates such as public representation and performance, 
communications that involve only physical proximity, where the transmission of the work is 
missing.19 Recital 27 limits the scope of the right by excluding the mere provision of physical 
facilities for enabling or making a communication.20  
 
15 DSMD Article 17(1) Article and Article (4)(b)and (c) DSMD. 
16 Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (C 410/19).  
17 M.Husovec and J.P. Quintais, “How to License Article 17? Exploring the Implementation Options for the 
New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms” (September 2014) < https://ssrn.com/abstract=3463011> accessed 
30 September 2020.  
18 Adopted 20 December 1996 (entered into force 6 March 2002) 2186 UNTS 121. 
19 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure (C-403/08) EU:C:2011:631 [2011] ECDR 11 at 
[201]-[203]. 
20 It is unclear who would qualify as a purely technical intermediary. For an explanation, see M. van Eechoud, P. 
B. Hugenholtz, S. van Gompel, L. Guibault, N. Helberger, Harmonising European Copyright Law: The 




The Article 3(1) definition was expected to “stand the test of changing technology”.21 The 
architects of the Directive foresaw that the communication right, including “making available”, 
and the other rights, would take on other “characteristics” and that it would be necessary to 
“adjust” them as a result.22 The CJEU has been instrumental in carving the offline and online 
dimensions of the CTTP right. The methodology of the CJEU in applying Article 3(1) InfoSoc 
is key to the application of the right. To determine the existence of an act under Article 3(1) 
under a specific set of facts, the CJEU follows an individual assessment.23 The same 
methodology applies to identify the user under that provision.24 Following the individual 
assessment, two cumulative elements must be met: an “act of communication” which is 
directed to “a public”.25 The analysis is supplemented by other criteria which include: “the 
indispensable role” of the user; the “deliberate” nature of their “intervention”; “in full 
knowledge of the consequences of [their] actions”; “the new public”; and the “for-profit” 
nature of the communication.26 These criteria are complementary, interdependent, are not 
autonomous, are present in “widely varying degrees” and are applied both individually and in 
combination with each other.27 The test was applied to various technical scenarios such as the 
transmission or retransmission of signals28 and broadcasts;29 the transmission of broadcasts by 
 
21 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society” OJ 
C 407 (28.12.1998) at [3.5]  
22 See Commission, “Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society” 17, COM (1995) 
382 final at [34]. 
23 Reha Training v GEMA (C-117/15) ECLI:EU:C:2016:379 [2016] 3 CMLR 40 at [35] and [44]; Phonographic 
Performance (Ireland) Ltd v Ireland and Others (C-162/10) EU:C:2012:141 [2012] Bus LR D113 at [30]. 
24 SCF EU:C:2012:140 [2012] ECDR 16 at [76] and [78]; Phonographic Performance EU:C:2012:141 [2012] 2 
CM.LR. 29 at [28]. 
25 ITV Studios Ltd EU:C:2013:147 [2013] Bus LR 1020 at [21] and [31]; Nils Svensson EU:C:2014:76 [2014] 
WLR(D) 67 at [16]; when one criterion is not met there is no CTTP Reha Training ECLI:EU:C:2016:379 
[2016] 3 CMLR 40 at [45]. 
26 Ibid at [64]. 
27 Ibid at [35]; SBS Belgium EU:C:2015:764 [2016] ECDR 3 at [15] and case law cited there; Phonographic 
EU:C:2012:141 [2012] 2 CM.LR. 29 at [30]. 
28 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL (SGAE) (C-306/05) 
EU:C:2006:764 [2007] Bus LR 52; Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním, os (OSA) v Léčebné 
lázně Mariánské Lázně as (C-351/12) EU:C:2014:110 [2014] [2014] 2 WLUK 931. 
29 FAPL EU:C:2011:631 [2011] ECDR 11; SCF EU:C:2012:140 [2012] ECDR 16; Reha Training 
EU:C:2016:379 [2016] 3 CMLR 40; Autoren, Komponisten und Musikverlegerregistrierte Genossenschaft mbH 




direct injection;30 the online retransmission of broadcasts;31 the hyperlinking to legal32 or illegal 
content;33 the embedding of legal content; the provision of cloud time-shifting service;34 the 
sale of a media player that gives access to illegal copies;35 the management of an online 
platform that indexes peer-2-peer torrents;36  and the reposting of a work already online with 
consent freely and for free.37  
I. The CTTP elements applicable to facilitators of access to illegal copyright content 
which may be relevant to hosting platforms 
One way to organise the extensive CJEU case law on CTTP is to split between cases where the 
original communication or making-available of works is made with the rightsholder’s consent 
and cases where the original communication is made without. The latter category includes the 
case law on facilitation of access to illegal copies of works in GS Media,38 Filmspeler39 and 
TPB.40 In GS Media, the CJEU found that hyperlinking to protected works freely available on 
a third-party website where they had been published without consent can fall within the scope 
of Article 3(1). Liability occurs when such a link-provider knew or should have known of the 
unauthorised nature of the linked content or when the link is provided for financial gain, the 
knowledge of the unauthorised nature of the linked content is presumed and the link-provider 
does not rebut the presumption by conducting the “necessary checks”.41 In Filmspeler, the sale 
of a media device customised with links that give access to content published without 
rightsholder consent fell within the scope of Article 3(1).42 In The Pirate Bay (TPB), the CJEU 
found that the management and operation of the TPB platform used by users to store and share 
 
30 SBS Belgium EU:C:2015:764 [2015] WLR(D) 466. 
31 ITV Studios Ltd EU:C:2013:147 [2013] Bus LR 1020. 
32 Nils Svensson EU:C:2014:76 [2014] WLR(D) 67; GS Media BV (C-160/15) EU:C:2016:644 [2017] C.E.C. 
442. 
33 BestWater International GmbH v Mebes (C-348/13) EU:C:2014:2315; [2014] 10 WLUK 615. 
34 VCAST Ltd v RTI SpA (C-265/16) EU:C:2017:913 [2017] 11 WLUK 694; [2018] 2 CMLR 12. 
35 Filmspeler EU:C:2017:300 [2017] Bus LR 1816. 
36 Ziggo EU:C:2017:456 [2017] Bus LR 1899; [2017] 6 WLUK 237. 
37 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Renckhoff EU:C:2018:634 [2018] Bus LR 1815; [2018] 8 WLUK 56. 
38 GS Media EU:C:2016:644 [2017] C.E.C. 442. 
39 Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler) EU:C:2017:300 [2017] Bus LR 1816. 
40 Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV, XS4ALL Internet BV (Ziggo) EU:C:2017:456 [2017] Bus LR 1899; [2017] 6 
WLUK 237. 
41 GS Media EU:C:2016:644 [2017] C.E.C. 442 at [49] and [51]. 




torrent files necessary for P2P file sharing is an act of CTTP within the meaning of Article 
3(1).43  
Hosting providers generally do not originate the copyright-infringing material uploaded and 
shared on their servers and, therefore, but they still increase the risk of copyright infringement 
because they provide the technical structures for their users to upload and share all types of 
content.44 thus potentially court the realm of application of the CTTP case law on facilitation 
of access to illegal copies of works under Article 3(1). 
II. The expansion of the “act of making available” to activities that facilitate access to 
works  
An act of communication online requires two aspects: an objective act of making available 
protected works by “any technical means of communication”45 and the “indispensable” 
“intervention” “in full knowledge of the consequences of its action” 46 to give access to the 
works to other users who would otherwise not be able to enjoy the works, or for whom 
accessing them would be more complex. By way of example, an act of making available covers 
on-demand communications such as connection to a server from which works may be accessed 
individually by members of the public at their will.47 The making available right is also 
triggered by the possibility of access: it is “sufficient to make works available (for example, by 
transferring a work to an electronic bulletin board)”.48 The notion of making available in 
Article 3(1) is expressed in technically neutral terms.49 The focus on technical neutrality is 
 
43 Ziggo EU:C:2017:456 [2017] Bus LR 1899; [2017] 6 WLUK 237. 
44 As hosting providers do not originate the stored copyright infringing content, they should not be placed under 
strict liability 
45 Ziggo EU:C:2017:456 [2017] Bus LR 1899 at [34]. 
46 GS Media EU:C:2016:644 [2017] C.E.C. 442 at [35]; ZiggoEU:C:2017:456 [2017] Bus LR 1899 at [36]. 
47 Jörg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties on Copyright: A Commentary on the WCT, the 
WPPT, and the BTAP (Oxford University Press 2015) point 7.8.26. 
48 WIPO, “Report of the Seventh Session of the Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne 
Convention” (Geneva, 22-24 May 1996) WIPO Doc BCP/CE/VII/4-INR/ CE/VI/4, 
4.<www.wipo.int/mdocsarchives/BCP_CE_VII_INR_CE_VI/BCP_CE_VII_4_INR_CE_VI_4_S.pdf> accessed 
23 January 2016; see also Nils Svensson et al v Retriever Sverige AB (C-422/12) EU:C:2014:76 [2014] WLR(D) 
67 at [19]; Stichting Brein v Wullems (t/a Filmspeler) (C-527/15) EU:C:2017:300 [2017] Bus LR 1816 at [20] 
and the case-law cited; Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Renckhoff (C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 [2018] Bus LR 1815 
at [29]. 
49 WIPO, “Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Questions, Proposal for the 
Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference” (10 December 1996) WIPO CRNR/DC/4 at [10.14]; 
Mihaly Ficsor, “The Spring 1997 Horace S. Manges Lecture—Copyright for the Digital Era: The WIPO 




described by Advocate General (AG) Trstenjak in SCF as “the functional approach” which 
“emphasises the aim of adequate protection of authors, irrespective of the technical details”50 
and which may lead to the enlargement of the right. Yet, the disregard of technical details 
appears to be only rhetoric. For example, if the technical nature of the underlying acts that 
make copyright-protected works available are irrelevant, then it is unclear why it is necessary 
to check whether an act amounts to the “mere provision of physical facilities” and is therefore 
excluded from the meaning of a relevant “communication”.51  
At the heart of the CJEU’s jurisprudence on “making available” is the finding that the provision 
of access to works amounts to an act of “communication”, which is introduced in Svensson, a 
case on hyperlinking to material made available online freely and for free and with 
rightsholder’s consent.52 In Svensson, the CJEU relies on the access theory to justify the 
existence of an objective act of making available. The “access theory, defines an act of making 
available as the provision of direct access to protected works.53 This proposition is arguable, 
since hyperlinks only facilitate access to works stored somewhere else, direct access is 
provided by the person who initially makes the work available online.54 The access theory is 
however perpetuated in the GS Media and Filmspeler decisions.55 In Filmspeler, the provision 
of access was technically complex. The device: 
…enable[d], in view of the add-ons pre-installed on it, access via structured 
menus to links that those add-ons which, when activated by the remote control 
of that multimedia player, offer its users direct access to protected works 
without the consent of the copyright holders.56 
The Filmspeler decision clarifies that direct access describes the users’ experience in accessing 
the works. In other words, the indirect provision of access from a technical perspective can 
qualify as “direct access” when access to works is perceived directly by users on their screens.  
 
50 See Advocate General Trstenjak in Societa Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Del Corso (C-135/10) 
EU:C:2012:140 [2012] ECDR 16 at [102]. The functional approach is contrasted by AG Trstenjak with the 
“technical approach” which considers technical details. 
51 Ziggo EU:C:2017:456 [2017] Bus LR 1899 at [38]. 
52 Nils Svensson EU:C:2014:76 [2014] WLR(D) 67 at [20]. 
53 Ibid at [18]. 
54 S. Dusollier, “Les Hyperliens en Droit d”Auteur Européen: Quand tout Deviant Communication” (2014) 54 
Revue du Droit des Technologies de l”Information 49, 57. 
55 GS Media EU:C:2016:644 [2017] C.E.C. 442 at [35]; Filmspeler EU:C:2017:300 [2017] Bus LR 1816 at [48]. 
56 Filmspeler EU:C:2017:300 [2017] Bus LR 1816 at [48], see also Arnold J in Paramount Home Entertainment 




In the TPB decision, the CJEU removes the “direct access” requirement in the situation of an 
online platform that enables internet users to locate torrent files in a Peer-2-Peer network and 
the platform is  specifically designed for copyright infringement. The CJEU changed the focus 
from the objective act of communication and placed the onus on the mental state of the entity 
which performs a CTTP. TPB re-interprets Svensson, GS Media, and Filmspeler to introduce 
the rule that: 
…any act which provides access to works by a user acting with full knowledge 
of the relevant facts, is liable to constitute an ‘act of communication” for the 
purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.57 
In the case of hosting platforms, it is indubitable that access is given to the content uploaded 
by the platform’s users. Following TPB, the relevant question is who is legally responsible for 
the provision of access to works hosted on the platforms: the platforms operators or the 
uploading users, or both? 
1. The “indispensable intervention of the user who acts in full knowledge of the 
consequences” 
In the case law on facilitation of access to illegal copies of works, the CJEU emphasises “the 
indispensable role played by the user and the deliberate nature of his intervention”.58 This 
criterion was first introduced in the SGAE decision in 2006 and subsequent case law application 
suggests that it serves as a causation test to identify who is a “user” responsible for the act of 
CTTP under the CTTP test.59 In cases of the facilitation of access to illegal copies of works, 
causation is “central” to the assessment.60 The intervention aspect establishes the factual cause, 
observable due to the use of contra-factual inference “in the absence of [which], those 
customers would not be able to enjoy the broadcast work, or would be able to do so only with 
difficulty”.61 An intervention needs to be “indispensable” or “essential”, terms of different 
intensity which are sometimes used interchangeably and are assessed within the confines of 
 
57 Ziggo EU:C:2017:456 [2017] Bus LR 1899; at [34]. 
58 Filmspeler EU:C:2017:300 [2017] Bus LR 1816 at [31]; Ziggo EU:C:2017:456 [2017] Bus LR 1899; at [26]. 
59 SGAE EU:C:2006:764 [2007] Bus LR 52 at [42]; see also the user mentioned in SCF EU:C:2012:140 [2012] 
ECDR 16 at [75]. 
60 GS Media EU:C:2016:644 [2017] C.E.C. 442 at [35]; Filmspeler EU:C:2017:300 [2017] Bus LR 1816; [2017] 
4 WLUK 447 at [31]; Ziggo EU:C:2017:456 [2017] Bus LR 1899; [2017] 6 WLUK 237 at [26]. 
61 Filmspeler EU:C:2017:300 [2017] Bus LR 1816; [2017] 4 WLUK 447 at [41]; Ziggo EU:C:2017:456 [2017] 




the factual context of the case.62 In particular, an act can be essential to the provision of access 
to a work even when there are other technical means online to access it.63  
The indispensable intervention by the user is “deliberate” and performed “in full knowledge of 
the consequences of his action, to give his customers access to a protected work”. This may 
mean that the user intended to cause the consequences, and the user is not acting in error or 
from a lack of understanding.64 This means rea serves to establish who is legally responsible 
for the provision of access to copyright-infringing works and may sometimes overlap with 
‘knowledge’ in the context of the ‘new public’ element discussed below.65  
In cases of facilitation of access to illegal copies of works, the standard of intention is obscured. 
Although Mr. Wullems in Filmspeler and the operators in TPB intervene with intention to give 
access to illegal copies of works, the language of the decisions point to various standards of 
knowledge. The Filmspeler decision appears to refer to Mr Wullems’s knowledge that he 
installs “add-ons that specifically enable purchasers to have access to protected works 
published — without the consent of the copyright holders of those works”, without having 
knowledge of specific copies of works being made available.66 This suggest that Mr. Wullems 
has only general knowledge that access is given to illegal copies of works. Although not 
mentioned in the decision, it is reasonable to assume however that Mr Wullems would also 
have a degree of knowledge of the specific illegal copies of works made available via the add-
ons as he would have needed to test the hyperlinks leading to those works are working before 
shipping the customised device. In TPB, the level of knowledge required in the “intervention 
in full knowledge” implies specificity, as the operators check if works are included in the 
categories and perform other editorial checks.67 The intervention in full knowledge element 
 
62 Ziggo EU:C:2017:456 [2017] Bus LR 1899; [2017] 6 WLUK 237 at [26] and [37]. 
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Paper #557, 4-5. 
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will be elaborated on in Alternative 3 which will detail based on existing case law as an avenue 
which shows that hosting platforms operators do not engage in a copyright relevant 
“intervention in full knowledge of the consequences”. 
III. The “public” and the “new public” 
Following the test for CTTP, once an act of communication is established, the next step is to 
assess whether the communication is aimed at “a public”, which is an indeterminate number of 
people that can access the communication.68 The public is assessed cumulatively, according to 
the number of people that can access the work in succession.69 As a de minimis, groups of 
people that are too small or insignificant are excluded. Both purchasers of a device that give 
access to illegal works and the users of TPB amount to “a public”.70  
It is not enough for a work to be communicated to a given public, as the public must be “new”. 
The notion of the “new public” was transplanted from the 1978 World Intellectual Property 
Organisation Guide by AG La Pergola in the EGEDA case in the context of the CTTP right in 
the SatCab Directive.71 The notion is subsequently adopted by the CJEU in the context of 
Article 3(1) in 2006 in the SGAE decision.72 Since then, the application of the “new public” 
element in CTTP is controversial, not only because the notion of “new public” lacks basis in 
binding legal texts but also because the application of the “new public” is protean.73 For 
example, in the situation where the act of communication takes place via a “new technical 
 
68 SGAE EU:C:2006:764 [2007] Bus LR 52 at [38]; SCF EU:C:2012:140 [2012] ECDR 16 at [84]; ITV Studios 
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Property Organisation, Geneva 1978) 71. 
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Velze, “Communication to a New Public? Three Reasons Why EU Copyright Law Can Do Without a ‘New 




means” there is an irrebuttable presumption of a “new public”.74 When the communication is 
done via the same technical means, such as the internet, the “new public” test needs to be 
satisfied.75 
The new public test assesses whether the communication of copyright works targets “a public 
which was not taken into account by the authors of the protected works when they authorised 
their use by the communication to the original public”.76 A limitation to the literal application 
of this test appears in cases where access is given to illegal copies of works: if there is no 
consent for the original communication, it is not clear how it can be assessed if the secondary 
communication targets a different public to the one the rightsholder had in mind when 
consenting to the initial communication. The CJEU avoids this conundrum by recognising that 
there is no public taken into account by the rightsholder where infringing copies of works are 
communicated:77 “[t]he same finding” (that the authors’ consent to the making available has 
included all internet users as the public and thus there is no new public) cannot be deduced 
“from those judgments failing such an authorisation”. In these cases, the “new public” is 
assumed and the CJEU assesses whether the user knows that their intervention “provides access 
to works published without authorisation of the rightsholders”.78 
IV. Knowledge 
In cases of facilitation of access to illegal copies of works, the knowledge of the user also 
modulates the responsibility of the entity which communicates to a “new public”. The 
considerations over knowledge balance the strict application of the “new public” test which 
would lead an automatic finding of “new public” which is a disproportionate result for the users 
involved in the communication of works and for third parties.79  
The application of the knowledge in the context of the “new public” is fraught with uncertainty. 
Under the banner of knowledge, the language in the decisions oscillates between various 
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standards. In GS Media, the CJEU introduced a test of actual and constructive knowledge – 
whether the link-provider knew or ought to have known that the image freely available on a 
third-party site to which they link was not published with the rightsholder’s consent.80 The 
knowledge of the hyperlink-provider needs to relate to specific works made available without 
consent. The CJEU held that when the link-provider knows or ought to have known that the 
link at issue provides access to a copyright-infringing work, such a link may fall under the 
scope of Article 3(1).81 When the link is provided for-profit or financial gain, the link-provider 
ought to have known that the link leads to illegal copies of a work, hence there is a rebuttable 
presumption of knowledge because the link-provider is expected to carry out all “necessary 
checks” to ensure that the work has not been published without consent.82 Acts of linking to 
works for financial gain thus impose a duty on the link-provider to ascertain whether the work 
is licensed or not.83 The scope of the duty is a source of academic debate which will be explored 
below.84  
In the subsequent Filmspeler and TPB decisions, the CJEU also refers to the profit-making 
nature of the activities, suggesting the application of a presumption of knowledge as in GS 
Media.85 Yet, the CJEU the decisions confusingly also refer to other forms of mens rea. It is 
clear from advertisements and other statements by the seller of the Filmspeler device and 
operators of TPB that they intended to enable access to illegal copies of works.86 In TPB, the 
site operators “could not be unaware” that the platform provided access to illegal copies of 
works given the high number of torrents on the platform.87 This points to a standard of 
constructive and general knowledge that access is given to copyright-infringing works. Overall, 
the references to various constructions of knowledge in those situations arising wherein the 
user clearly intends the infringement obfuscates the very assessment of the mental state 
required with the “new public”. Standards such as actual and constructive knowledge also steer 
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the CTTP test in a direction that overlaps with unharmonised national notions of indirect and 
criminal liability as these doctrines also consider the mental state of the infringer.88 It remains 
to be seen if those doctrines will be displaced by the CJEU decisions on CTTP and facilitation 
of access to illegal copies of works. 
V. “For-profit”- a non-essential element with important implications 
Finally, the “for-profit” element is considered “not irrelevant” for the existence of an act of 
CTTP.89 Yet profit plays an important role in setting the scope of liability as GS Media links 
profit with the presumption of knowledge and the corresponding duty of care. In the case of 
hyperlinking to illegal copies of works, it is unclear if the posting of a link carried out “for-
profit” which is connected to the presumption of knowledge refers to direct profits gained from 
the act of linking or the general operation of the website.90 In GS Media, as the hyperlink 
provider the GeenStijl newspaper could financially benefit directly from hyperlinking the 
leaked Playboy images of the Dutch starlet, it is advanced that a connection should be necessary 
between the act of hyperlinking to illegal content and the profit made which triggers a 
presumption of knowledge.91 Yet in many situations, it may not be possible in practice to show 
a connection between the hyperlink and profits made by the hyperlink-provider.  
In Filmspeler, the sale and offer for sale of the customised media device were considered to be 
“for-profit”. In TPB, the CJEU referred to the significant advertising revenue gained by the 
platform.92 Although not clearly specified by the CJEU these references to “for profit” invite 
the inference that the presumption of knowledge that access is given to illegal copies of works 
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applies to platforms.93 The link between profit and the presumption of knowledge underlies the 
application of duties of care to hosting platforms under Alternative 1 below.  
 
C. Alternative 1: Hosting platforms and duties of care under Article 3(1) 
The complex CTTP test analysed above may be applied to hosting platforms in several 
configurations, some reaching opposing solutions that generate differing consequences for 
rightsholders, platforms, technical innovation and the freedom of expression and information 
of the internet users active on these platforms. In this paper, possible interpretations are offered 
in Sections C-E. Under a first interpretation, the liability of hosting platforms that provide 
technical tools for users to upload content may be constructed based on joint tortfeasance. In 
EU CTTP case law, joint tortfeasance was first applied by the CJEU in Airfield, a case 
concerning satellite broadcasting.94 A single indivisible act of communication of TV content 
to subscribers may be legally attributed both to the broadcasting organisation that supplies the 
signal carrying copyright works and to the satellite package provider that gives subscribers 
access to works being indispensable to making those works available to the public and is not a 
mere provider of facilities.95 In TPB, the users and the operators of TPB together engaged in a 
single act of CTTP infringement which could be split between the uses and operators of TPB 
platform. The users originated the torrent files that led to copyright files stored on the nodes of 
the peer-2-peer network. Then, the TPB operators intervened “with full knowledge of the 
consequences of their conduct, to provide access to protected works”96 by indexing torrent files 
which enabled users to locate works in the context of a P2P network, therefore playing an 
essential role in making the works available. On this basis, in TPB Advocate General Szpunar 
argued that platform operators should be simultaneously and jointly liable with the users of the 
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network making available the works shared.97 The CJEU decision appears to endorse this view 
of CTTP.98  
Hosting platforms may represent a borderline situation as the platforms perform a socially 
desirable role, but at the same time provide the technical tools for users to upload and share 
content, some of it copyright-infringing, but without themselves encouraging copyright 
infringement.99 When the provision of the technical conditions for users to upload and share 
content may be seen as an act of CTTP, to avoid joint liability with their users, a limitation on 
liability via a duty of care to conduct “necessary checks” of the uploaded content could be 
imposed.100 Such an option is available if the decisions in GS Media, Filmspeler and TPB 
harbinger a duty of care within the CTTP right which may be applicable to hosting platforms.101 
It may be argued that hosting platforms gain advertising or other revenue, therefore a “for 
profit” element exists to the operation of these services, which may justify the application of a 
duty of care. Alternative 1 thus explores the application and limits of a duty of care under 
Article 3(1) to limit the liability of hosting platforms under the same provision.  
With hosting platforms, experts argue that the scope of the duty of care should be moderated 
by a standard of reasonableness assessed case-by-case.102 Under an objective test, the extent of 
the duty would depend on the type of hosting provider and the provider’s propensity for 
infringement, the commercial nature of the activity, and what measures are reasonable in the 
circumstances.103 The size of the provider and its financial resources should also be taken into 
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account. Reasonableness would also prevent the imposition of measures that are technically 
impossible for the host.104  
The standard of reasonableness resembles a proportionality assessment. In the case law on 
injunctions against intermediaries whose services are used for copyright infringement in 
Article 8(3) InfoSoc and the corresponding provision in the third sentence of Article 11 of the 
Enforcement Directive, the Court sought to establish a “fair balance” between the protection 
of copyright and the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals affected by such 
measures.105 In L’Oreal v eBay the CJEU held that the measures taken should be “sufficiently 
dissuasive, but avoid creating barriers to legitimate trade, and offer safeguards against their 
abuse”.106 In assessing what is proportionate, courts would have to balance the effect of the 
duty of care on rightsholders and platforms and the interests of internet users.  
Rightsholders’ copyright as intellectual property is protected under Article 17(2) of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Yet that protection is not inviolable nor absolute, as the CJEU 
repeatedly found that the protection of copyright needs to be balanced against other 
fundamental rights.107 Given that legal content is also shared via hosting platforms, these 
benefit from the right to conduct business set out in Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.108 This involves the right for any business to be able to freely use, within the limits of 
its liability for its own acts, the economic, technical and financial resources available to it.109 
An infringement of the freedom of a hosting service provider to conduct its business would 
take place if the provider has to install a complicated, costly, permanent filtering system at its 
own expense.110  
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The interests of internet users are also protected by law. Internet users benefit from protection 
against infringements of their right to protection of their data provided under Article 8 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Anti-copyright infringement measures that involve the 
identification, systematic analysis and processing of information connected with users’ profiles 
created on social media platforms amounts to use of protected data as information regarding 
user profiles is personal data as it allows users to be identified.111 Users have additional rights 
provided by the exceptions and limitations to copyright protection under Article 5 InfoSoc. In 
Panier, the CJEU held that the quotation exception in Article 5(3)(d) reflects users’ exercise 
of the fundamental right to freedom of expression which in that case gained precedence over 
the rights of authors.112 In Deckmyn, the exception for caricature, parody, or pastiche in Article 
5(3)(k) InfoSoc fosters the exercise of freedoms of expression for their beneficiaries.113 The 
CJEU recently recognised in Funke Medien and Spiegel Online that the exceptions and 
limitations in Article 5 InfoSoc “confer rights on the users of works or of other subject 
matter”.114 Therefore the application of the duty of care would have to respect the fundamental 
rights of users and the application of exceptions and limitations under Article 5 InfoSoc.  
Various possibilities exist to tailor a potential duty of care for hosting platforms under Article 
3(1) that balances all these rights to various degrees. Under the duty of care, Ohly argues that 
at least a duty to take-down copyright infringements following a notification from rightsholders 
may be available.115 This duty could be extended to an obligation to block the same infringing 
content from resurfacing on the platform. The duty of care could also be extended to include 
equivalent infringements from those notified by the rightsholders from resurfacing provided 
that the notion of equivalent infringements is interpreted strictly.116 Removal obligations may 
be triggered once the provider gains “awareness”, the behaviour expected may be that of a 
“diligent economic operator” as in the L’Oréal v eBay decision on the application of the hosting 
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limitation in Article 14 Directive 2000/3 (E-Commerce Directive).117 Finally, the duty of care 
may also include the application of preventative mechanisms to ensure that no copyright-
infringing content surfaces on the platform. The following sections will address aspects of a 
duty of care that involve the duty to check content before it appears live on the platform and 
obligations as to notice and take-down and stay-down. 
I. The duty to check content before it appears live on the platform is illegal  
Some argue that the activity of YouTube, which organises search results into categories and 
rankings and recommends videos to its users based on user preferences may be similar to the 
activity performed by the operators of The Pirate Bay (TPB) where the CJEU had held that 
such operators “rank, they categorise, they display overviews and they recommend”.118 
YouTube acts with constructive knowledge which can be presumed based on advertising 
revenue generated from user uploads or with the general knowledge that copyright-infringing 
content may be uploaded to the website.119 If hosting providers such as YouTube may be seen 
as analogous to blatant infringers such as TPB operators, this justifies the expectation that these 
hosting providers are under a stringent duty of care to check the content. Rightsholders argue 
that a high level of copyright protection as provided under Recitals 4 and 9 InfoSoc may be 
ensured only when the duty to check applicable to hosts providers to check the legality of 
content before it is uploaded.120 
The argument that host providers such as YouTube and Cyando can be legally expected to 
proactively check for copyright infringement content before it is uploaded on the platforms and 
without the need for rightsholder cooperation in identifying the copyright-infringing content 
was convincingly rejected by AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in his Opinion in the YouTube/Cyando 
referral. The AG opposes the analogy between YouTube and TPB on the basis that, in the case 
of YouTube, technical features such as searching and indexing do not show the operator’s 
intention to infringe copyright.121 He also rejected the presumption of knowledge as introduced 
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in GS Media as it is only applicable to acts of hyperlinking and overall is unfit for hosting 
platforms such as YouTube and Cyando.122 This was because, in GS Media, the website 
operator posted the link himself, and hence had specific knowledge of the linked content. In 
the case of platforms such as YouTube and Cyando, this presumption is unworkable as it would 
entail the assumption that host provider who generates profit has both knowledge of the files 
stored on its servers by its users and awareness of whether or not they are illegal, thus requiring 
the operator to perform the “necessary checks”.  
If the presumption of knowledge in GS Media could be applied to host providers such as 
YouTube, it would have the effect of creating an ex-ante obligation to monitor uploaded 
content. As AG Saugmandsgaard Øe points out, such an obligation would amount to imposing 
a general obligation to monitor the information it stores and to actively seek illegal acts or 
circumstances indicating illegality by, for example, monitoring all files provided by the users 
of the platform before they are adopted. This outcome is barred by Article 15(1) of E-
Commerce Directive which prohibits Member States from imposing general monitoring 
obligations on providers covered by liability exemptions in Articles 12-14 of the Directive.123 
General monitoring refers to the active monitoring of all data of each of the platforms’ users to 
prevent any future infringement of intellectual-property rights.124 Hosting platforms such as 
YouTube may be argued to perform the function of host providers as per the definition of a 
host in Article 14 E-Commerce Directive which refers to information society services which 
provide, amongst other activities, the transmission or storage of information supplied by a 
recipient of the service.125 Therefore, the prohibition on general monitoring applies to hosting 
platforms such as YouTube.  
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe also found that an obligation on hosting platforms to pre-emptively 
check the content their users intend to publish “would introduce a serious risk of undermining” 
the fundamental rights of the platforms to conduct business as set in Article 16 of the Charter, 
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the right of users to receive and impair information under Article 11 and the freedom of the 
arts under Article 13 when users upload their creations.126 Implementation of such a measure 
where platforms manually check content would also be impossible to achieve given the vast 
amount of content uploaded. Platforms would also be tempted to err on the side of caution and 
over-remove content to avoid liability.127 The implementation of such preventive checks at the 
point of upload by filtering would also infringe users’ fundamental rights as filters are 
imperfect at distinguishing copyright-infringing from non-infringing content.128 However, as 
the obligation to check content before it appears live on the platform breaches EU law, less 
intrusive measures may be possible under the duty of care approach.  
II. A duty of care to remove specific content may be available under EU law 
Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive places hosting platforms under an obligation to 
remove specific illegal content once they have actual knowledge of its existence. An analogous 
obligation may be included within the scope of the duty of care under Article 3(1) InfoSoc 
Directive. Such an obligation to remove content may generate tension with the application of 
exceptions and limitations in Article 5 InfoSoc Directive. When operators of hosting platforms 
need to remove a specific piece of infringing content following notification from rightsholders, 
the notification should state the work which is infringed, the exclusive rights or licences the 
notifier has over the work and a reasonable explanation as to why no copyright exception is 
applicable.129 In the case of notifications that concern blatantly infringing content, for example, 
a video containing a Netflix show episode, the reliability of rightsholders’ assessment over the 
illegality of the content is straightforward. Problems begin in borderline situations where 
exceptions and limitations in Article 5(3) InfoSoc may apply. Arguably, most relevant 
exceptions and limitations in relation to uses of works on hosting platforms may be Article 
5(3)(d) concerning quotations, Article 5(3)(k) concerning parodies and Article 5(3)(i) 
concerning the incidental inclusion of a work or other subject matter in other material. 
Copyright holders may not possess the requisite legal knowledge to make an informed 
assessment regarding the legal status of the work’s use. Rightsholders are not a homogenous 
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group and whereas some such as Hollywood studios have extensive legal advice, individual 
rightsholders cannot be assumed to understand the intricacies raised by the application of 
copyright exceptions and limitations. All rightsholders may also be tempted to err on the side 
of caution in their assessments.  
Instead, hosting platforms may be required to employ trained staff that assesses the accuracy 
of the rightsholders’ notifications regarding specific infringing content made available on 
hosting platforms.130 Given that millions of bits of content are uploaded on hosting platforms’ 
servers daily, the expense of checking all notifications raises operations costs, hence the 
legality of this obligation is not clear. Under EU law, the costs of copyright enforcement bourn 
by a platform are relevant to the proportionality of a measure. The CJEU has held that measures 
imposed on an intermediary can restrict the free use of their resources because it obliges them 
to take measures which may represent a significant cost, have a considerable effect on their 
activities or require difficult and complex technical solutions.131 The platforms’ freedom to 
conduct a business enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter is, however, only impaired when “the 
very substance” of that freedom is affected. 132 This does not take place when the intermediary 
has the flexibility to put place measures that are “best adapted” to the provider’s resources and 
abilities and are compatible with other challenges raised in its other activities. 133 The use of 
trained staff to assess the validity of a copyright notice does not seem out of line with the daily 
operations of many hosts who already have to employ staff to assess the illegality of other types 
of content such as terrorist communications, hate speech, and other indecent communications. 
However, given the volumes of data involved, and the potential for notifications, the 
assessment of each rightsholder notification by a human reviewer may be too onerous in 
practice. 
One cost-effective way to automatically remove content on notification by rightsholders is via 
automated systems, such as YouTube’s ContentID. The disadvantage is that such tools may 
remove content that would normally be covered by an exception or limitation. A well-known 
example is the YouTube takedown of a copyright lecture by Professor William Fisher of 
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Harvard. The lecture contains snippets of various sound recordings to demonstrate a point on 
compulsory licencing, and this use of sound recordings may be exempt by the fair use doctrine 
in the US.134 Most problematic is the safeguard of mechanically non-verifiable exceptions. In 
particular, the application of exceptions such as for caricature, parody or pastiche in Article 
5(3)(k) InfoSoc requires a degree of legal sophistication which cannot easily be programmed 
into a filter. Any accidental removal of exempt uses may, in theory, be mitigated by the 
provision of a complaint and redress mechanism for internet users. Should a work be taken 
down which is covered by the exception, the user could appeal.135  
The effectiveness of such a complaint and redress system is also questionable. Data from 
internet user counterclaims against the takedown of content reveals that few appeal. Google’s 
Transparency Report shows that between January and March 2020, a total of 6,111,008 videos 
were automatically removed from YouTube, of which 165,941 were appealed and subjected to 
human review and 41,059 subsequently reinstated.136 Although the Report is not specific to 
copyright takedowns, the information therein is still revealing. Given that very few users appeal 
takedowns, the implication is that the availability of complaints and redress mechanisms in 
practice largely serves to support the legitimacy of automatic notice and takedown procedures. 
One way to safeguard the application of exceptions and limitations in Article 5(3) InfoSoc 
Directive may be seen in the definition of “specific content” in Glawischnig-Piesczek, a 
defamation case, where the CJEU found that Article 15(1) E-Commerce Directive allows an 
injunction that requires Facebook to remove and monitor specific content declared illegal in 
court.137 Under the terms of that injunction, Facebook has to remove content identical to that 
deemed illegal; content which is equivalent to it or block access to it, and the injunction can 
have an effect worldwide.138 The definition of a “specific” case is interesting for our purposes. 
In Glawischnig-Piesczek, the CJEU found that a “specific case” may consist of a particular 
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piece of information stored by the host provider at the request of a certain user of its platform, 
the content of which was examined and assessed by a court having jurisdiction in the Member 
State, which, following its assessment, declared it to be illegal.139 This approach could be 
followed in the area of copyright in a situation where the duty of care would also cover 
borderline situations where exceptions and limitations in Article 5(3) InfoSoc may apply.  The 
aplication of the duty could be conditioned on rightsholder’s submitting to the platform a 
court’s decision which identifies an infringement and hence the non-application of a specific 
exception. By subjecting the application of the duty of care to a court finding of infringement 
in the underlying uploaded material the scope for the removal of content covered by exceptions 
and limitations is largely mitigated.140  
Again, there are limitations to this approach. Court proceedings are expensive, slow, and 
impractical for rightsholders therefore not suitable for high volume infringements. In addition, 
due to the territorial application of copyright, a finding of infringement in one Member State 
does not apply cross-border. The list of exceptions in Article 5(3) InfoSoc is also optional, and 
an exempted use in one EU Member State may not be exempted in the next, therefore 
rightsholders would have to know where to bring proceedings. Yet these drawbacks may be 
mitigated by the fact that the bulk of infringement consists of identical copies of copyright-
protected works.141 Therefore subjecting the removal of suspected and borderline infringement 
cases to court scrutiny may not detract substantially from the efficacy of the duty of care. 
Rightsholders would go to court only when they felt they had a real case against a specific use, 
which would reduce the potential for opportunistic takedown requests. This approach would 
also allow for the sharing of information between users of these platforms whilst protecting 
against the most serious offences. The reduction of copyright enforcement efficacy would be 
offset by fundamental rights gained by users and platforms. 
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III. A duty of care to include the stay-down of identical infringements may be available 
under EU law 
A stay-down duty would require hosting platforms after receiving notice from rightsholders 
regarding copyright infringements to remove the content and take measures to ensure that it 
does not resurface on the platform.142 This measure appears in line with EU law in L’Oréal v 
eBay where the CJEU allowed for the imposition of measures aimed at preventing “further 
infringements of that kind”.143 
Fulfilment of the duty of care in this context once again requires the application of content 
recognition technology such as filtering, as the manual removal of re-appearing infringing 
content is near-impossible.144 The application of these technologies to prevent copyright 
infringements from resurfacing raises the emergence of general monitoring prohibited by 
Article 15(1) E-Commerce Directive. In SABAM and Netlog, the CJEU rejected the collecting 
society SABAM’s injunction which required the social media site Netlog to install a filtering 
system that monitored its servers for copyright infringement in musical, cinematographic or 
audiovisual works stored by Netlog's users. The monitoring was to be applied to all users for 
an unlimited period as a preventative mechanism and at the expense of the platform.145 
However, Recital 47 E-Commerce Directive states that monitoring duties in specific cases are 
legal. For example, when the provider would have to prevent the reposting of illegal copies of 
specific works on the providers’ network. Yet the line between general monitoring and 
monitoring in specific cases is not a clear one. In particular, when rights holders request the 
stay-down of numerous specific titles the cumulation of specific works amounts to general 
monitoring.146 Further clarification regarding the line between monitoring in specific cases and 
general monitoring is necessary. 
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IV.  Additional systemic advantages and disadvantages of a harmonising the liability of 
hosting platforms via duty of care in the context of Article 3(1) 
The duty of care approach may introduce a conditional responsibility regime within the scope 
of Article 3(1). This might become be a balanced solution as the fulfilment of the duty of care 
would remove the application of direct liability. The duty of care solution supports the Digital 
Single Market as it provides a unified solution to the longstanding difficulties of reconciling 
the liability of hosting platforms for copyright-infringing content uploaded by users at the 
national level. By bringing the activities of hosting platforms under the scope of the exclusive 
right under Article 3(1), they come within the scope of the EU’s harmonisation mandate.147 
According to the AG in TPB, the discrepancies in national approaches “undermine the 
objective of EU legislation in the relatively abundant field of copyright, which is precisely to 
harmonise the scope of the rights enjoyed by authors and other rightsholders within the single 
market”.148 
From the perspective of rightsholders, applying a liability standard based on duties of care is 
that it involves a negligence standard. Normally, the subsistence of the exclusive right of CTTP 
requires an act which amounts to a use of the work. The violation of certain standards of 
conduct relating to the duty of care are performance-based aspects and have never before been 
linked to the elements of an exclusive right. The European Copyright Society considers this a 
“remarkable deviation from the traditional way of tailoring exclusive rights”.149 The duty of 
care applied for the CTTP right in Article 3(1) may be perceived as watered-down once subject 
to a strict standard.  
From the perspective of internet users,  another problem is that the duty of care approach where 
hosting platforms work to reduce the availability of copyright-infringing content on their 
servers privatises copyright enforcement and may open the gates for private censorship. Were 
the duty of care to be placed within the scope of Article 3(1), a breach would expose platforms 
to primary liability and damages for their failure to act against copyright-infringing uploads, 
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with potentially expensive consequences. This would incentive platforms to remove or block 
content at the merest suspicion of copyright infringement and the potential effects on freedom 
of expression and information under Article 11 of the Charter are clear. Over-zealousness 
enforcement would increase the likelihood that non-copyright-infringing content would be 
removed or blocked, including content covered by exceptions and limitations. Caution, 
therefore, should be exercised when setting the scope of the duty of care and safeguards for 
users should become paramount. 
D. Alternative 2: May hosting platforms be exempt from joint liability for 
communicating works to the public via Recital 27 InfoSoc? 
A separate interpretation sees the activities of hosting platforms as the provision of “physical 
facilities” as per Recital 27 InfoSoc Directive, with the consequence that the platforms are not 
performing an act of communication and therefore not open to duties of care within the context 
of Article 3(1).150 Recital 27 states that “[t]he mere provision of physical facilities for enabling 
or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of 
this Directive”. In CJEU jurisprudence on CTTP, the mere provision of facilities as in Recital 
27 InfoSoc, is set out as the opposite to an intervention “in full knowledge of the consequences 
of its action, to give access to the protected work to its customers” required for an act of 
“communication”.151 Although Recital 27 is not an element of the test for CTTP in Article 3(1), 
it was explained by AG Sharpson in SGAE that the recital acts as an “unequivocal” limitation 
to the establishment of an act of communication which is a requirement for CTTP liability152  
Although the wording “physical facilities” suggests an application limited to the provision of 
technical equipment, there is a suggestion in the literature that Recital 27 may also apply to 
certain intermediaries.153 This point has also been raised at the national level, in particular in 
the Netherlands in the case of a supplier of Usenet services.154 At CJEU level, the only 
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indication that Recital 27 may apply to hosting platforms appears in TPB where the CJEU 
invokes Recital 27 to justify the existence of an “intervention in full knowledge” by the 
operators of the P2P sharing platform.155 If Recital 27 only applies to physical carriers of data, 
then it is a non sequitur that an online platform may be a provider of facilities, unless recourse 
to Recital 27 is only cosmetic to reinforce the idea that TPB operators were engaging in a 
copyright relevant intervention.  
The opinion of AG AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in the YouTube/Cyando referral makes a strong 
case for the application of Recital 27 to hosting platforms. The AG explains that any CTTP 
involves a chain of interventions by several players in different capacities and to different 
degrees. In that chain, a distinction needs to be drawn between operators of the platforms 
performing an “active intervention” in the content uploaded by users, which contributes to the 
operators’ primary liability under Article 3(1), and the provision of physical facilities under 
Recital 27. YouTube and Cyando were seen as mere providers of physical facilities under 
Recital 27. The intervention by the operators of hosting platforms is limited to the provision of 
“server space” or “an electronic communication service”, activities considered to fall within 
the application of Recital 27.156 This is the most expansive application of Recital 27 at the 
CJEU level.  
I. An active intervention  
In the view of AG AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in YouTube/Cyando, the entity which performs an 
act of communication (as opposed to a provider of facilities) “is the one who voluntarily 
intervenes to transmit works to an audience so that, in the absence of its intervention, that 
audience would not be able to enjoy it”, thus playing an essential role.157 This includes the 
person who decides to transmit the work to an audience and who actively initiates the 
communication, such as the internet users of the services.158 To perform an act of 
communication, “a service provider goes beyond the role of intermediary when he intervenes 
actively in the ‘CTTP’ of works”. An active intermediary “selects the content transmitted, 
determines it in some other way or presents it to a public in such a way that it appears to be his 
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own”. Here, the reasoning of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe draws a parallel between active 
intervention and liability for “making content one’s own” which applies to content providers 
in Germany.159 An active intermediary can also be a provider engaging in a “subsequent use of 
that “communication”, by retransmitting it to a “new public” or according to a “different 
technical mode”. In all these situations the provider does not merely provide installations but 
plays an essential role by voluntarily communicating works to an audience.160 An active 
intermediary is communicating jointly with the users that provide the illegal content.  
II. Recital 27 and hosting platforms 
Intermediary providers whose services are used to carry out a CTTP following the instructions 
of their users do not decide on their own initiative to transmit the works supplied to an audience 
are thus covered by Recital 27.161 YouTube/Cyando do not perform an active intervention in 
the content provided and are hence are covered by Recital 27. Firstly, the AG Saugmandsgaard 
Øe finds that it is the platforms’ users who play an indispensable role as they decide to make 
works available via the platforms by choosing the adequate option in the context of YouTube 
and by sharing online the download links in the case of Uploaded.162 Internet users perform an 
intervention without which platforms could not transmit the works or users could not enjoy the 
same works.163 Secondly, due to the automated nature of the uploading system, the platforms 
do not determine the content uploaded and are not engaging in a selection of the uploaded 
works.164 The control exercised a posteriori, for example, to react further to a notification 
cannot amount to a selection of content a fortiori.165 Ex post control over certain content can 
also not reflect the choice of the operators to communicate that content.166 Thirdly, there is no 
subsequent use of the works by the platforms to a new public or according to a different 
technical means, as at issue, there is only one communication initiated by the users.167 
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In addition to these points, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe also refutes the argument put forward by 
the rightsholders that the structuring of user-uploaded content, integrating that content into a 
viewing interface, indexing the content in categories, the provision of a search function which 
processes search results and the classification of content are relevant to a finding of CTTP.168 
He argues that the structuring of content uploaded by users does not preclude the conclusion 
that Recital 27 applies as there is nothing in the Recital to suggest that provision of facilities 
needs to be “simple”; a degree of sophistication is allowed to facilitate its use. These activities 
are designed to optimise access and facilitate the platform’s use, and this does not amount to 
an active intervention in the CTTP initiated by the users.169  
The AG differentiates between optimising access to the uploaded content and optimising the 
uploaded content itself: 
The fact that a platform such as YouTube has a standard viewing interface does 
not, in my view, lead to the conclusion that its operator presents the content to 
the public in such a way that it appears to be its own, provided that this interface 
indicates, for each video, which user has posted it.170 
In relation to Cyando, the argument cannot apply as the platform did not structure the content 
stored by its users, and that a third-party site acted as link collections are irrelevant to the legal 
status of the upload platform.171 
Recommended videos such as by YouTube are automatically generated based on previous 
views and do not reflect the operator’s decision to communicate works.172 The stipulation in 
the general conditions of use of the platform, that each user grants YouTube a free non-
exclusive worldwide license for the uploaded videos does not show that the operators are 
actively involved in the content, as the stipulation applies automatically to all content 
uploaded.173 This would not be the case if the operators of the platforms re-used the content.  
Finally, the remuneration received by YouTube via advertising revenue or by Cyando by 
subscription revenue does not affect the conclusion that they are not providers of facilities 
 
168 Ibid at [81]. 
169 AG Henrick Saugmandsgaard Øe in YouTube/Cyando EU:C:2020:586 at [82]. 
170 Ibid at [83]. 
171 Ibid footnote 61. 
172 Ibid at [84]. 




within the meaning of Recital 27.174 Following the decision in Reha Training, the AG opined 
that the for-profit element is not relevant to the existence of a CTTP. The AG also opined that 
the for-profit nature of a provision of facility enabling a communication does not cancel the 
application of Recital 27.175 Secondly, he argued that the link between profits and the 
attractiveness of uploaded content does not lead to a finding of CTTP, as it is the users who 
decide what content is uploaded.  
The AG largely drew on case law which advances a distinction between an active and passive 
service provider as developed in the CJEU Article 14 E-Commerce. For example, in Google 
France, it was the user of the service who chose the trademark signs as keywords, not the 
search engine provider itself, who was passive.176 Similarly, in L’Oréal v eBay the user of the 
marketplace published the sale offers consisting of trademark-infringing goods.177 Following 
the L’Oréal v E-Bay decision, the AG was not persuaded that structuring the presentation of 
the offerings and indexing and the provision of a search function was relevant, hence should 
not be relevant in the case of CTTP.178 The AG, therefore, found that operators of YouTube 
and Cyando were not directly liable under Article 3(1), but may attract secondary liability at 
the national level.  
III. The scope of Recital 27 InfoSoc is not sufficiently wide to limit the direct liability of 
intermediaries  
It is not clear cut that Recital 27 is best placed to constrict the liability under Article 3(1) of 
hosting platforms such as YouTube and Cyando. The legislative history, wording and CJEU 
case law application of Recital 27 suggest that the inclusion of intermediaries such as YouTube 
and Cyando within the scope of that recital is strained. When the InfoSoc Directive was being 
drafted, hosting platforms were unheard-of. Recital 27 InfoSoc implements phrase 1 of the 
Agreed Statement on Article 8 of the World Copyright Treaty (WCT) which states that: “It is 
understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a 
communication does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty 
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or the Berne Convention”.179 The Agreed Statement is “intended to clarify the issue of liability 
of service and access providers in digital networks like the Internet”.180 It was introduced 
following intensive lobbying by non-governmental organisations representing internet service 
providers (ISPs) and telecommunication companies. These parties sought to obtain some 
guarantee concerning liability limitations for infringement committed by their users on their 
networks. 181 The Statement clarifies that there is no direct liability for entities covered by it, 
with contributory and vicarious liability still available at the national level.182 It reflects the 
idea of Basic Proposal I of 1996 Note on Article 10 WCT (which subsequently became Article 
8 WCT). The Basic Proposal extends the right of CTTP to making available right of works and 
it is explained that “what counts is the initial act of making the work available, not the mere 
provision of server space, communication connections, or facilities for the carriage and routing 
of signals”.183 This is understood as providers who sell cables or computers or devices for 
online communications.184  
The Statement is implemented in the EU by Recital 27 InfoSoc. The ethos of that recital was 
expressed by AG Trstenjak in SCF: “persons who provide players, but do not at the same time 
control access to copyright works, do not make any communication to the public”.185 Examples 
of activities that may be covered by Recital 27 that have filtered through the CJEU case law 
include the sale of TV sets and the mere installation of TV sets without the distribution of 
signals;186 placing a computer with an internet connection at the disposal of the public in a 
cybercafé or library;187 the sale or rental of televisions or radios; or where an ISP merely 
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provides access to the internet.188 These parties are too removed from the chain of causation to 
attract responsibility for communications to the public. 
Recourse to Recital 27 in CJEU judgements on CTTP largely serves to reinforce by contrast 
the existence of an intervention in full knowledge by a user.189 A technical act falling under 
Recital 27 also has the role to maintain “the quality of the reception in the signal catchment 
area” for an audience covered by the initial authorisation of the rightsholder.190 
The CJEU has only twice limited the application of CTTP in Article 3(1) by recourse to Recital 
27, which has received strict interpretation. This is unsurprising given the wording “mere” and 
“in itself” in Recital 27. In SBS Belgium, the Court held that direct injection transmissions by 
broadcasting organisations to distributors of signals who give access to subscribers to those 
broadcasts are not a CTTP performed by the broadcasting organisation but by the distributors 
who may transmit signals via decoders or other transmission technologies.191 Yet in some 
cases, responsibility for transmissions by direct injection is not carried out by distributors when 
they are not independent of the broadcasters, and their intervention is purely technical; it is just 
a means to improve the reception of the broadcast.192 These distributors could be ISPs involved 
in the distribution of broadcasts communicated by broadcasting organisations.193 In Stim, a car 
rental company offering short-term rental of cars equipped with radio receivers, was not 
intervening in full knowledge of the consequences of its action to give their customers access 
to a protected work.194 Recital 27 applies as there is no “additional intervention” from the car 
hiring company which makes it possible to receive via the radios pre-installed in the vehicle 
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the terrestrial broadcasts available in the area where the vehicle is located.195 In both SBS 
Belgium and Stim, the entity potentially covered by Recital 27 acts as a mere carrier in the strict 
sense for the works communicated by the broadcasting organisation. This suggests that the 
application of Recital 27 requires that the interference with the content of the communications 
transmitted needs to be kept to a minimum. 
Services such as YouTube and Cyando go beyond the minimum level of involvement specified 
by CJEU case law in SBS Belgium and Stim. Hosting platforms automatically structure, 
categorise and provide recommendations in the case of YouTube, and Cyando provides 
automatic access links to the uploaded content. Although these processes are automated, they 
nevertheless foster a closer contact with the individual works uploaded by the platforms’ users 
than the degree of contact that providers covered by Recital 27 such as ISPs apply. Although 
ISPs automatically engage with the data that is uploaded by users on their networks, for 
example by routinely filtering the internet for spam or blocking access to illicit sites,  the nature 
of their involvement is different from that of hosting platforms. The EU has taken note of 
different levels of interaction with the data transmitted by the various information society 
services. The E-Commerce Directive specifies in Articles 12-14 a graduated system of 
exemptions from liability at the national level for internet intermediaries that qualify. The 
application of the limitation from liability at national level of hosting services that store content 
provided by their users (such as hosting platforms) is predicated upon an additional condition 
which requires hosts to expeditiously remove or disable access to illegal content uploaded by 
their uses on their networks upon gaining actual knowledge or awareness that illegal content is 
available therein.196 Such a condition does not exists in the case of the liability limitation in 
Article 12 applicable to mere conduits such as internet access providers. The reason for this 
difference in legal treatment between hosts and mere conduits is “based on providers” degree 
of involvement with the content transmitted and their scope for monitoring content.”197 
Abstracting the role of hosting platforms with the content uploaded by their users to that of a 
mere provider of facilities would stretch the purpose and CJEU application of Recital 27. This 
does not mean that hosting platforms are liable for an act under Article 3(1), rather, Alternative  
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3 below will show that the limitation to the liability of hosting platforms paper may be 
achievable within the range of the test for CTTP itself.  
E. Alternative 3: Hosting platforms do not intervene in full knowledge to give access to 
copyright-infringing copies of works 
The interpretation advanced under this alternative departs from the opinion of AG Øe that the 
intervention of YouTube and Cyando in the communication initiated by their users amounts to 
“the mere provision of facilities’ as per Recital 27. Instead, it advances a new alternative of 
application of the CTTP test under which operators of certain hosting platforms that provide 
the technical conditions for internet users to upload content are not performing an act of 
communication for the purposes of Article 3(1) InfoSoc Directive. Although content is made 
available by users via these platforms, that act may only be attributed to users that upload 
content. Under the evaluation advanced in this section, the operators of certain hosting 
platforms do not act “in full knowledge of the consequences of his conduct to give customers 
access to a work illegally posted on the internet”.198 Hence, there is no need to look further at 
whether the platform operators communicate to a new public and corresponding knowledge 
element.  
I. Platform operators may not perform a copyright relevant “intervention” in “full 
knowledge” with the copyright-infringing content uploaded by their users 
The CJEU has emphasised the essential role played by the user who intervenes, in full 
knowledge of the facts, to give the public access to protected subject matter,199 but the notion 
of “intervention” in CJEU jurisprudence on CTTP remains undefined. The Court has 
repeatedly described a copyright-relevant intervention with adverbs such as “indispensable” or 
“essential” implying that, in the absence of that intervention, the public can access the works 
only with difficulty.200 At first sight, any intervention in the chain of causation which leads to 
accessing copyright content may be seen as “indispensable” or “essential” the ISP that supplies 
internet to TPB servers is performing an indispensable intervention, bar Recital 27, but a close 
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look at the application of the “intervention in full knowledge” element across CTTP case law 
reveals various thresholds for copyright-relevant intervention. 
2. Hyperlinking case law 
Control over the provision of access to works by manually triggering that access is the essence 
of an intervention in hyperlinking cases. In Svensson, an intervention was held to take place 
when the hyperlink “allow[ed] users of the website on which it is [manually] posted [by the 
user] to circumvent the restrictions taken by the site where the protected work is posted to 
restrict the public’s access to its own subscribers”201 In GS Media, the provision of a hyperlink 
amounted to a deliberate intervention when the link-provider acts with the requisite knowledge 
or is placed under the presumption of knowledge and does not conduct the necessary checks.202 
The CJEU states that: 
…rightsholders, in all cases, have the possibility of informing such persons [i.e. 
hyperlink-providers] of the illegal nature of the publication of their work on the 
internet and of taking action against them if they refuse to remove that link.203 
Although in GS Media the onus was on knowledge, it is only because the link-provider 
controlled access to the work in the first place via the link that the CJEU recommended the 
takedown of the link as a viable course of action. In Filmspeler, Mr Wullems: 
“with full knowledge of the consequences of [its] conduct, pre-installs onto the 
‘Filmspeler’ multimedia player that he markets add-ons that specifically enable 
purchasers to have access to protected works published – without the consent 
of the copyright holders of those works – on streaming websites and enable 
those purchasers to watch those works on their television screens”204 
In other words, Mr. Wullems took control over access to the illegal copies of works by 
customising its device with hyperlink-carrying add-ons which it then sold as a service that 
facilitated direct access to those works.  
3. Case law on a joint act of CTTP 
In the case law on a joint act of CTTP performed two players, there is an additional layer to an 
intervention in the supply of works initiated by third parties. It can be seen from the decisions 
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in Airfield and TPB that in addition to the personal involvement of the operators in triggering 
access to the works supplied by a third party, the operators of exercised decision making over 
the content provided in their own service and for-profit. In Airfield, the CJEU found that the 
activities by Airfield, satellite television provider which sold a package of satellite channels 
that can be accessed by subscribers using a satellite decoder, amounted to an intervention in 
the signal supplied by a broadcast organisation. The intervention targeted a “new public” as its 
action to encrypt the signals or supply access keys created a link between the broadcast 
organisation and the subscribers.205 This act did not ensure or improve reception but made 
works available to an additional public than the public originally envisaged by the 
rightsholder.206 Airfield also bundled several channels from different broadcasting 
organisations into a new audio-visual product, deciding on the composition of the package 
created.207 This largely follows the opinion of AG Jääskinen that the broadcasting organisations 
lost control of the operations following Airfield’s intervention.208 Furthermore, Airfield had 
the discretion to include or not the television programmes in its service.209 
With peer-2-peer file sharing, TPB jointly with their users provided access to unauthorised 
copies of works in a peer-2-peer network. The operators intervened by making available the 
platform that indexed and provided a search engine for the torrents leading to illegal works, 
thus playing an essential role in the file-sharing.210 They also “indexe[d] torrent files in such a 
way that the works to which the torrent files refer may be easily located and downloaded by 
the users of that sharing platform “with the goal of aiding users to find the files”. 211 This way 
the administrators controlled access to the illegal copies of works on the network as they 
provided the technical structures to access them and checked “to ensure that a work has been 
placed in the appropriate category. In addition, those operators delete obsolete or faulty torrent 
files and actively filter some content”.212 When the operators delete obsolete or faulty torrents, 
they personally exercised content control over the uploaded torrent files. These aspects also 
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contributed towards identifying the mens rea to give access to illegal copies of works. The 
operators must have acquired some specific knowledge from personally curating the categories 
and from being involved in the deletion of files.  
Considering CJEU case law on a joint act of CTTP, the activities of hosting platforms such as 
YouTube that provide the technical conditions for users to upload and share licenced and 
unlicensed content by indexing, providing a search engine, automatically categorising contents 
and providing recommendations but without the platform operators exercising choice over the 
copyrighted content uploaded and made available, do not amount to a copyright-relevant 
intervention in the communication. The platforms do not match the level of intervention 
achieved on a joint CTTP. In Airfield, the operators exercised choice over what content was 
supplied. In TPB, in addition to the provision of the platforms, the operators were personally 
involved in curating the files. When hosting platforms provide an automatic upload process, 
“and without material being seen in advance or controlled by the operator”,213 the intervention 
is technical and does not involve decision-making by the operators over the individual 
uploaded content. In the case of YouTube, the classification of uploaded videos is done 
automatically based on the information provided by the user. Video recommendations are made 
via an algorithm using machine learning and recommendations are provided on objective 
factors which do not include considerations over the legal nature of the content.214 The 
operators are not personally involved with curation of the uploaded content and therefore do 
not intervene within the meaning of existing case law.  
In the case of cyberlockers such as Cyando, a hyperlink is issued automatically to a user when 
that user uploads content. In this case, the control over the access to the work is exercised by 
the platform user who decides to make the link public to other users on designated link sites. 
The intervention in full knowledge may be attributed to the internet user who uploads content 
and manually shares the hyperlink with third parties. Consequently, the providers of 
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cyberlockers may also not be placed under the presumption of knowledge and require 
conducting the “necessary checks”. 215  
II. Operators of hosting platforms may lack the requisite knowledge that they provide 
access to illegal content of works 
In Filmspeler and TPB, the providers acted with intention to give access to illegal content and 
boasted about the infringing purpose of their services. The standard of intention is also in line 
with the standard embraced by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in Reha Training at this point 
of the CTTP analysis.216 With hosting platforms such as YouTube, the use of automatic 
processes and lack of involvement of operators led to the conclusion that the operators only 
have general knowledge that copyright infringing content is hosted and shared on the platform. 
Hosting providers’ operators do not act with intention to give access to illegal content 
Should anything less than the intention to give access to illegal copies be acceptable, then the 
CJEU will have to clarify which knowledge standard is applicable. AG Szpunar, in TPB, 
advised against the application of a presumption of knowledge to peer-2-peer indexing 
platforms as this may lead to a general obligation to monitor indexed content.217 The same 
argument was extended by AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in YouTube/Cyando.218 Although not 
binding on the CJEU, at the national level the liability of hosting platforms based on general 
knowledge of infringement has been rejected.219 In this case, a standard of specific knowledge 
may be more appropriate and potentially in line with one of the CJEU  knowledge inferences 
in TPB decision. This could be coupled with a standard of actual knowledge acquired following 
a notification from the rightsholder. If the platform does not take down the content in question, 
it may be seen to have intended to facilitate access to it by omitting to remove it. 
Rightsholders may argue that Alternative 3 does not deliver the high level of protection 
required by Recitals 9 and 10 InfoSoc and does not help the purposes of the Digital Single 
Market. However, they are not left empty-handed. Rightsholders can also apply for injunctions 
against hosting platforms under Article 8(3) InfoSoc and the third sentence of Article 11 
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Directive 2004/48 (the Enforcement Directive). In particular, hosting platforms may be held to 
certain obligations concerning infringing content along the lines of the measures discussed 
under the duty of care approach discussed in Alternative 1.220 Rightsholders may also apply 
under their right to information in Article 8(2)(a) of the Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Directive (2004/48)221 to request information from hosting platforms regarding the identity of 
platform users who infringe.222 Unharmonised forms of secondary liability or equivalent may 
also be available at the national level.  
F. Conclusions 
The question of whether hosting platforms that provide the technical tools for users to upload 
infringing material amounts to a relevant use by the platforms under Article 3(1) may be 
answered in several ways. This article opposes a broad application of the CTTP test to hosting 
providers based on strict liability. In this case, the sledgehammer of liability for damages may 
have longstanding implications for technological innovation in the area. Ultimately, only the 
big providers would be able to pay the damages and ensuing licence, therefore entrenching pre-
existing dominant positions in the area. Internet users would also miss out on opportunities to 
engage in online information exchanges.  
The solutions proposed in this article analyse three interpretations of the communication right 
in Article 3(1) which would achieve a nuanced outcome more in line with the fair balance 
objectives of Recital 31 InfoSoc. The duty of care approach in Alternative 1 provides a solution 
based on a conditional liability for hosting platforms. This way hosting platforms that oblige 
are saved from paying damages. The flip side is that a regulatory regime based on duties of 
care moves copyright away from its property rights status and closer to torts such as unlawful 
completion. Considering the dynamic evolution of the internet and the flexible nature of the 
CTTP elements as developed in case law, it is possible to envisage other possibilities. 
Alternative 2 considers but ultimately dismisses a solution to hosting provider liability based 
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on Recital 27. Instead, Alternative 3 clarifies that in some situations hosting platforms do not 
perform an act of CTTP as they may not be engaging in an “intervention in full knowledge of 
the consequences to give access to illegal copies” element of the test. This mean that some 
hosting platforms may not perform a copyright relevant act of “communication” to the public.  
The direct infringement copyright claims against hosting platforms come at a time when 
technology has come of age and is no longer seen as deserving of special protection. The eyes 
of the world are on the EU and the overall resolution achieved in the case of hosting platforms. 
Other jurisdictions are seeking to address the legal status of such online platforms. Across the 
Atlantic, the US is contemplating such a review and the Copyright Office’s Section 512 Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act study recommends that the US should wait and learn from 
developments in the EU.223  
The ideas discussed in this paper may also be relevant for a future UK approach to hosting-
platform liability for infringing content after Brexit as the UK is moving away from the EU 
and will not implement the DSMD: 
“We shall see how the copyright directive is implemented and how the various 
enforcement regimes within it will work, but of course it is not possible for us 
to remain part of it, because we will not accept the jurisdiction of the CJEU in 
these matters”.224 
A void may appear in the regulation of hosting platforms in the UK, and it remains to be seen 
to what extent the UK may take inspiration from its (former) European brethren. 
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